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PLAYING BY MARKET RULES: ANTI-DOPING 
POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Kayla McCulley 
In the past two years, the European Union has demonstrated a strong desire to 
incorporate the regulation of sport into its legal framework. While the responsibility for 
sports governance has traditionally fallen to non-governmental federations and national 
Olympic COl1unittees, the development of sport as a hugely profitable, big business market 
has necessitated the application of internal market provisions to sports-related issues. 
Previously excluded from any mention in Treaty documents, the term "sport" has been 
inserted into the Lisbon Treaty as a new area ofEU shared competence under the proposed 
Article 2E, which shall allow the EU to "carry out actions to support, coordinate, or 
supplement the actions of the Member States."l One such issue that has attracted the 
attention of the EU is professional sports doping, which is defined as the use by athletes of 
performance-enhancing drugs and substances banned by their federations, including 
stimulants, anabolic steroids, and hormone-based drugs (Houlihan 1999). This paper will 
examine the relatively short history of Conununity involvement in anti-doping policy, 
including the M eca-Medina v. Commission ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2006 
and the European C0l111nission's White Paper on Sport published in July 2007, both of 
which directly address doping. It is argued that these actions by the European Union, aimed 
at formulating a cultural and legal convergence around a conU110n anti-doping framework, 
will incite a moderate level of political pushback from the related stakeholders, chiefly the 
International Olympic Conllnittee (IOC) and sports federations. 
Sports governance in the EU is characterized by multi-level competencies and 
overlapping spheres of influence. The vertical organizational structure of each sport, such as 
football , tennis, or cycling, is largely the same for each activity. At the base level are the 
athletes, coaches, and medical personnel that together form the Olympic or professional 
teams, which in turn are administrated by the sports federations, such as cycling's Union 
Cycliste Internationale (UCI) or soccer's Federation Internationale de Football Association 
(FIFA) , and the National Olympic Committees. The International Olympic Committee 
based in Lausanne, Switzerland, exercises the greatest oversight over international arbitration 
of sport. While quadrennial Olympic competitions remain an inherently national domain 
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(with participation determined by an athlete 's citizenship) the world of professional clubs 
and to urnaments has signifi cant transboundary characteristi cs that require non-
govermnental institutions such as the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to regulate 
its rules and competitions. Issues such as broadcast rights, free movement of labor, and 
n1illion-dollar acquisition of ownership rights have transformed the face of modern sport 
into one that mirrors the corporate world of big business. D o the sports federations, thus, 
still have the capacity to regulate the expanding socio-economic dimensions of sport? The 
issue of anti-doping in the European Union presents a case study that provides partial 
answers to this question, and gives insight into the futu re direction of international sports 
governance. In the past two years, the European Union has demonstrated a strong desire to 
incorpo rate the regulation of spo rt into its legal framework, achieved both through 
Conmussion work and decisions handed dow n by the E uropean Court of Justice. 
In tandem with the unparalleled opportunities for international stardom and lucrative 
sponsorship and contracts, the use of performance-enhancing drugs among athletes has 
increased considerably. The IOC has identified doping as the single greatest problem facing 
the sports community today.2 Traditionally, responsibility for regulating this problem has 
fall en to non-goverm11ental actors like the national sports federations and independent 
organizations such as the World Anti-Doping Association (WADA) , created in 1999 under 
IOC auspices. The catalyzing o rganization for European-wide consensus on the importance 
of regulating the doping problem was the Council of Europe, which published the 
European Anti-Doping C harter in 1984. Without making any comparable declarations on 
its interest in sports governance, the European Union nevertheless approached the issue 
circuitously through two sports-related cases before the European C ourt of Justice in the 
1970s. These rulings - first in the Walrave judgment in 1974, followed by Dona in 1976 -
reined in sport's previously independent status outside of EU market regulation. Yet for the 
European Union, the specific problem of doping would remain outside the policymaking 
agenda until just recently, notably in the Meca-Medina decision in July 2006 and the EC 
White Paper on Sport one year later, both of which con cretized the EU's will to legislate 
in the domain of sport. 
EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTI-DOPING POLICY 
Historically, the Council of Europe, an entirely separate organization from the 
European Union institutions with its own legal structure, has provided the initiative for 
framing sport and its economic and cultural significance in a European context. During the 
late 1960s, the evidence of doping in sport accumulated, most markedly with the deaths of 
professional cyclists as a result of amphetanline use. These revelations produced a watershed 
effect in policy development to address the negative health risks of doping (Houlihan 1999). 
Apart from pure physiological gains, doping was further promulgated throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s for political interests, since political supremacy cam e to be associated with a 
nation 's sporting prowess in international competition . Cold War tensions contributed to the 
ratcheting-up of doping amongst elite athletes. When it became clear that certain Soviet 
Union athletes were experimenting with anabolic steroid use, American Olympic coaches 
and doctors justified their own clandestine doping regime on the basis of gaining 
geopolitical supremacy. Clearly, if the Olympic Committees were subverting their own 
testing regimes, the impetus fo r anti-doping laws needed to com e from above. The m ost 
dynamic actors in the initial policy coordination stage were the sports federations, who 
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began instituting testing programs at major sporting events such as the 1966 World Cup. This 
was not simply a move aimed at preserving the ideals of their respective sports; rather, the 
federations were motivated by a desire to retain control over the anti-doping programs and 
keep goverrmlent-imposed solutions at arm's length. At the time, the IOC lacked the 
necessary resources to maintain an effective umbrella ban on doping, despite their unilateral 
declaration condemning the practice in 1962. 
Involvement at a regional level was gradually initiated by the Council of Europe - a 
rival organization outside of the European Community - which positioned itself as an 
intermediate forum between national goverrullents and international sports federations . As 
Houlihan notes: 
The reason for the interest of the CE in sport in general and doping in 
particular is a product of its broad objective to promote democratic government 
in Europe and the belief, which can be traced back to the League of Nations, 
that cooperation in areas such as culture creates a 'spill-over effect' in policy 
areas more central to the organization's priorities. 
The CE produced a recommendation on doping in 1978 which emphasized the need 
to educate athletes and coordination among federations . In 1984, the most significant step 
yet in the fight against doping was the adoption of the European Anti-Doping Charter. The 
theme of the Charter was the familiar European goal of harmonization, stating "Sports 
organizations should be encouraged to harm.onize their anti-doping regulations and 
procedures, based on those of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the 
International Amateur Athletic Federation .. . " as well as using a common list of banned 
substances.3 While the Charter invoked the goal of European harmonization, it explicitly 
left the task of administering anti-doping rules to the sports federations rather than national 
or regional governance. The Charter was welcomed by related stakeholders such as 
UNESCO, the World Health Organization, and the IOC among others. The document 
provided a model for the International Doping Charter (later renamed the Olympic Doping 
Charter) that was to follow in 1988. Beyond the general ideological consensus that doping 
must be eradicated as much as possible from sports, the complexity of actually implementing 
a transnational framework tested the strength of the traditional sports model. 
Of foremost significance was the realization by international federations of the 
resource cost of implementing an effective doping control regime. As the debate 
moved from questions of principle, where the federations felt able to assert a 
prior right to set behavioral norms for athletes, to matters of implementation 
the resource capacity of government made a shift in the locus of decision-
making inevitable (Houlihan 323). 
As noted above, the early catalyst for anti-doping regulation was the non- EU 
affiliated Council of Europe. However, the transnational aspect of sport and the greater 
extent to which doping was becoming ingrained in elite-level sporting events created an 
incentive for EU involvement. For them to be an effective deterrent, anti-doping programs 
needed to be forceful and comprehensive, which would require outsized budgets beyond the 
means of the National Olympic COIl1lruttees or the sports federations. In order to ensure 
substantive results through comprehensive testing programs, the participation of Member 
State goverrullents became increasingly important, thus inviting greater EU action to 
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manage the disparate anti-doping regimes, justifYing their actions under the banner of 
harmonization. Before any anti-doping legislation would appear, however, the EU relied 
upon EC] rulings - some as early as the 1970s - to justifY interfering in the domain of sport. 
THE ApPLICATION OF EU LAW TO SPORT 
In Paragraph 1 of the Nice Declaration on Sport in December 2007 , the EU 
recognized that sport possesses certain "special characteristics," according it special status 
under existing EU treaty clauses. 
Even though not having any direct powers in tlus area, the ConmlUnity must, 
in its action under the various Treaty provisions, take account of the social, 
educational and cultural functions inherent in sport and making it special, in 
order that the code of ethics and the solidarity essential to the preservation of 
its social role may be respected and nurtured. 4 
The so-called "specificity of sport" is a term established by early European Union case 
law that declares sports rules of a "purely sporting interest" to fall outside the scope of EU 
jurisdiction. Conversely, then, European law only applies to "economic activities." The 
Community courts and the Conmussion have also acknowledged the freedom of internal 
organization according to the European sports model, characterized by a monopolistic 
structure. (Typically, there is a single national sport association per sport and Member State 
operating under the umbrella of a single European association and one international 
association.5) The "specificity" principle was upheld in the rulings of the Walrave6 and Dona7 
cases, wluch were the first cases ·involving sports rules to come before the Community 
courts during the 1970s. More recently, however, the Bosman decision in 1995 was a 
significant step in the direction of applying the Treaty on European Union's market law to 
the sport sector.8 Bosman struck down football association rules that linuted international 
transfers and foreign membership of players on European clubs as violating Treaty of Rome 
and TEU free movement of labor laws. Thus, the commercialization of sport and its 
mirroring of the "big business" corporate model have indisputably changed the nature of 
sport to where sport raises substantial econonuc concerns. 
Doping presents a clear violation of free and fair competition, but does the specificity 
principle in this case preclude EC law? In 2006, the European Court of Justice deviated 
from its previous stance in the Walrave and Dona cases when it established a new test for 
considering sporting rules as economic in nature, and thus subject to single market 
regulation. The case of David Meca-Medina and Igor Majeen v. Commission (2006) was the first 
judgment by the Community Courts that applied competition law as outlined in Articles 
81 and 82 EC to a sporting rule by a sports association relating to a sporting activity. Article 
81 prohibits "all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the common 
market. .. " (Treaty of Nice, 2000). In conjunction, Article 82 outlaws "any abuse by one or 
more undertakings of a donlinant position within the common market. .. " (Treaty of Nice, 
2000). Whereas Bosman and the preceding case law had applied Treaty provisions to other 
areas of economic freedoms, such as the free movement of labor and services, the Meca-
Medina ruling called into question the "specificity of sport" and developed a test for 
determining whether or not a sporting rule falls within the boundary of Articles 81 and 82 
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on anti-trust laws. 
The plaintiffs in the case were two swinuners, David Meca-Medina and Igor Majcen, 
who had tested positive for the steroid nandrolone and received a four-year ban from the 
swinuning governing body, Federation Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA) in 
1999. After their case was rejected by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) , an arm of 
the IOC in Lausanne, the swinullers challenged the compatibility of the anti-doping rules 
with Articles 81 and 82, arguing that they restricted competition. In 2004, the Court of First 
Instance rejected the case, citing the "purely sporting" interest of the IOC anti-doping rules. 
The objective of anti-doping rules, it was argued, was the preservation of fair play rather 
than any econOlnic activity; thus, the CFI upheld the existing jurisprudence in the WaLrave, 
Dona, and Bosman decisions that subjected sporting rules to Conmmnity law only insofar as 
they constituted an economic activity. 
Angered and unsatisfied with the CFI's judgment, Meca-Medina and Majcen played 
their final card: an appeal before the Conununity's highest court, the Court of Justice (ECJ) 
in 2006. While the ECl's final conclusion was in line with its lower court's previous ruling, 
it altered course from the CFI by calling into question the "specificity of sport" and 
establishing a test to decide whether the sporting rule represents either an "undertaking" or 
an "association of undertakings," in which case it would be subject to anti-trust law. In 
Paragraph 27, the Court concludes that 
... the mere fact that a rule is purely sporting in nature does not have the effect 
of removing from the scope of the Treaty the person engaging in the activity 
governed by that rule or the body which has laid it down.9 
The judgment effectively established a case-by-case methodology to determine the 
nature of a sporting rule. No longer would "purely sporting" rules enjoy inmlediate 
exemption from Conununity law. Although the ECJ reiterated the findings by the Court of 
First Instance that anti-doping rules do, in fact, fall into the category of purely sporting rules, 
it nevertheless held that these rules must still be subjected to a novel test to determine their 
1) o~jectives, 2) whether the anti-competitive effects are inherent in pursuing said objectives, 
and 3) if the effects are proportionate to the objectives . 
. . . even if the anti-doping rules at issue are to be regarded as a decision of an 
association of undertakings limiting the appellants' freedom of action, they do 
not, for all that, necessarily constitute a restriction of competition incompatible 
with the common market, within the meaning of Article 81 EC, since they are 
justified by a legitimate objective. Such a limitation is inherent in the 
organisation and proper conduct of competitive sport and its very purpose is to 
ensure healthy rivalry between athletes. lO 
The Court now has the same tools for assessing rules of a sporting nature as it does 
to regulate the internal market. While not explicitly revoking the special status of sport, the 
Meca-Medina case will allow for greater European scope when it comes to sporting activities 
that could potentially disrupt the proper functioning of the internal market. 
THE EU TAKES Up THE FIGHT AGAINST DOPING 
Following the promulgation of the European Anti-Doping Charter in 1984, 
momentum was gathering for further government involvement in addressing the problem 
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of anti-doping. The 1992 Olympics in Barcelona provided a fertile testing ground for the 
implementation of an EU-backed code of conduct, which was followed by a ConmlUnity 
Support Plan presented in 1999 in light of the doping scandals that had marred the 1998 
Tour de France. 11 In that document, the Commission reconunended to the other EU 
institutions a three-part action plan: 1) the assembly of a relevant epistemic community to 
draw upon the ethical, legal, and scientific knowledge of experts; 2) assist in the creating of 
the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) along with the Olympic Movement; and 3) 
generally increase the use of Conununity tools to integrate anti-doping policy into the 
supranational capacity. The reason for the Conunission's decision was primarily one of 
concern for public health. In the introduction, the Conunission states: 
Doping has always been at variance with the basic principles of sports ethics. 
Today, in view of the proliferation of cases, the phenom.enon of doping in sport 
no longer belongs within the strict framework of sports ethics but has also 
become a public health problem. In principle physical and sporting activity 
should contribute to improving the citizen's quality of life. However, the use of 
prohibited substances or medicaments abuse has adverse health effects and 
hence vitiates the very goal of sport. In the context of competitive sport, doping 
symbolizes the contrast between sport and the values it has traditionally stood 
for, nam.ely fair play and the idea of surpassing oneself through physical 
effort."12 
The themes addressed in the Conununity Support Plan established a precedent for 
even more direct action by the EU.The Nice Declaration of December 2000 articulated by 
the European Council emphasized Europe's special relationship to sport as the region that 
gave birth to the O lympic movement and also the site of the majority of large sporting 
competitions. The COl1unission acted most recently with the publication of the July 2007 
White Paper on Sport, which moved the EU closer to establishing a sports-related clause 
under treaty law. 
The White Paper on Sport in July 2007 marked the first time the European 
Conunission had comprehensively addressed issues in the arena of sport, including a specific 
section entitled "The Fight against Doping" (Article 2.2.). N evertheless, as the document 
points out, the recognition that sport plays an important role in European society is not new, 
given the existing case law (as previously discussed) that already had come to frame sport as 
part of the acquis communautairc. Like the COllUnunity Support Plan that preceded it, the 
White Paper on Sport recognized the negative "health and prevention dimension" of 
doping, explicitly adding the need for a law-enforcement component at EU level. The 
exchange of best practices between WADA, UNESCO, INTERP0L13, and other 
stakeholders factors as a key goal of the Conunission. The White Paper floats the idea of "a 
network of national anti-doping organizations of Member States," which would 
theoretically gain a large degree of autonomy from the international sports federations in 
formulating broad anti-doping policy measures. 
Despite the conciliatory "Euro-jargon" contained in the language of the White Paper, 
its endorsement by the Union represents a clear direction for European collaboration. The 
tactics of cooperation outlined in the White Paper reflect a particular policymaking 
approach aimed at greater EU involvement in sports governance. Wallace, Wallace, and 
Pollack define policy coordination as a "technique to develop light forms of cooperation 
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and coordination in fields adjacent to core EU economic competences in order to make the 
case for direct policy powers ... the approach rests a great deal on expertise, and the 
accumulation of technical arguments in favor of developing a shared approach and to 
promote modernization and innovation" (Wallace 85). Action by the Commission is 
typically the primary engine for setting the direction and pace of policy making in the 
coordination mode of policymaking. Most importantly, the Lisbon Treaty developed during 
2007 makes a direct acknowledgement of sport under Article 2E, stating that the EU shall 
"carry out actions to support, coordinate, or supplement the actions of the Member 
States."14 Indeed, it would appear that the EU desires a greater degree of regulatory power 
to control anti-doping programs within its jurisdiction. Thus, pending ratification of the 
treaty by all 27 meluber states, sport and its attendant sub-issues will gain a legal basis under 
treaty law in addition to the existing juridical precedents for subjecting sport to internal 
market rules. 
POLITICAL PUSHBACK FROM THE IOC AND SPORTS FEDERATIONS 
These developments within the last two years - first the Meca-Medina ruling in 2006, 
followed by the White Paper on Sport in 2007 - elicited serious criticism from the IOC 
and the two largest governing bodies for football, FIFA and the Union Europeene de 
Football Association (UEFA). These non-governmental organizations have traditionally held 
substantial authority for sport regulation, and saw the European Union's legal and legislative 
forays into the sporting domain as an attack on their dominion. What was it about these two 
occurrences that differed from the consensus-building spirit of the 1980s and 1990s? The 
application of single market rules to sport in Meca-Medina, argued Gianni Infantino, UEFA's 
Director of Legal Affairs, represents: 
. .. a potential Pandora's box of potential legal problems. For a start, almost any 
sports disciplinary measure for almost any offense (e.g. doping, match-fixing, 
gambling, bad conduct, etc.) might be described as representing a condition 'for 
engaging in' sporting activity.IS 
Similarly, current IOC president Jacques Rogge noted in an interview with the 
Financial Times on October 17, 2007 - days before the Lisbon summit would hammer out 
a new reform treaty - the critical need to establish a more well-defined legal basis for sport 
in European law, and hoped for a Treaty provision recognizing the specificity of sport. "The 
judgment of the Meca-Medina case is a bit frightening for us," said Rogge. "It puts doping 
under the competition rules of the EU.We have had established doping rules for a long time. 
We know proportionality of sentences is an issue, and we accept that. But we don't know 
why the EU should come in".16 
With regard to the White Paper on Sport, the IOC and UEFA teamed up to present 
a joint press statement that articulated their reservations over the expanding EU competency 
in their sphere of governance. 
The White Paper is structured in full contradiction with the actual architecture 
of the Olympic movernent, ignoring in particular the regulatory competences 
of the International Federations, the division of responsibilities between the 
latter and their European Confederations, the global nature of the issues and 
challenges currently affecting sport as well as the solutions which are today 
necessary. 17 
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The non-governmental stakeholders like the JOC and the federations had also hoped 
for a ITlOre clear expression of the Nice Declaration to preserve the specificity of sport, and 
thereby their own powers in setting anti-doping and other sporting activity measures. 
CONCLUSION 
Relations between the sports governing bodies and the EU have often proved 
contentious; indeed, it took more than 30 years after the establishm.ent of the European 
Comm.unity in 1957 before the Union set up formal dialogue and liaisons with the IOC 
and the sports federations. The proposed Reform Treaty will perhaps allay some of the 
controversy over the lTI.anagement of sport within Europe. Just days after Rogge's 
disparaging comments about the Meca-Medina decision and his doubtfulness that the EU 
would continue to respect the specificity of sport, the Lisbon Reform Treaty, signed in 
December 2007 , introduced the first mention of sport ever included in a treaty document: 
... the Union shall contribute to the promotion of European sporting issues, 
while taking account of the specific nature of sport, its structures based on 
voluntary activity and its social and educational function . IS 
Naturally, the JOC welcol1l.ed this turn of events that they had been pushing for all 
along, and could count on retaining their traditional standing as the foremost regulatory 
body in the fight against anti-doping. However, more cases involving the test for 
determining whether or not a sporting activity contravenes Conullunity law are certainly 
on the horizon, and the potential for more concrete policymaking in the European 
Commission does not appear to be impossibility. While the European Union has come to 
an agreement over the fundamental values of sport and in particular the need for anti-
doping regulation, the problems of overlapping authority in setting policy and resolving 
disputes will ensure that the doping issue remains a source of friction. 
The Meca-Medina decision and the EC White Paper on Sport were not the first 
instances of a European interest in anti-doping, yet they were significant for what they 
represented: the establishment of a legal basis for EU governance in sport. As explained 
above, during the 1990s the EU set itself in opposition to the Council of Europe whose 
initiatives had began the fight against anti-doping in the first place. By establishing its own 
legal regime separate from that of the CE and JOC, the European Union was essentially 
poaching a subject oflaw that had traditionally remained outside of the acquis communautaire. 
Brussels' actions in the sphere of sport indicate an astonishing trend: the single market and 
economic competition are being used to justifY a cultural and legal convergence across what 
many Europeans consider to be the domain of extra-EU organizations, exemplified by anti-
doping programs. Single market principles are spilling over into areas of EU competency 
that were wholly unintended by the original founders of the European Conullunity in 
1957. As sporting events such as the Tour de France and the Olympics accrue even more 
international prominence through broadcasting and marketing rights, the stakes of athletic 
success - and the temptation to achieve that success by drug doping - are growing 
exponentially. Balancing the competing sovereignties of non-governmental actors with EU 
legislative powers in the future will be critical if the health of athletes and society's respect 
of sporting competition is to endure. 
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